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Abstract 
Purpose of the study: This research aimed to examine the effect of Good Village Governance (GVG), external 
supervision, and citizen participation on the fraud potential in village funds management and its consequent impact on 
village government performance. 
Methodology: The sample studied involved 60 respondents including village officials in Demak Regency, Central Java, 
Indonesia. The data was collected. We use Structural Equation Model (SEM) and use WarpPLS tools to examine 
causality tests among variables. 
Main Findings: The results showed the implementation of GVG did not have a significant effect on the fraud potential 
in fund management while external supervision and citizen participation have a negative and significant effect. 
Furthermore, the GVG implementation and citizen participation were found not to have a significant influence on village 
government performance while external supervision and fraud have a negative and significant effect. Moreover, fraud 
has a very strong influence and it is the most dominant determinant of village government performance, therefore, it 
should be handled with serious attention. 
Applications of this study: External supervision of village fund management is needed to reduce fraud and improve 
performance. Besides, the implementation of GVG can also support improved village government performance. 
Novelty/Originality of this study: This research builds a model and examines the GVG concept model that can be a 
solution to the problem of fraud and the low performance of local governments in Indonesia. 
Keywords: Fraud, Village Government Performance, Good Village Governance, External Supervision, Citizen 
Participation. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Indonesian Government through Law number 6 of 2014 on Villages authorized village governments to manage 
certain funds for the development of villages. This led to the disbursement of IDR 20.7 trillion in 2015, IDR 46.9 trillion 
in 2016, and IDR 60 trillion in 2017 to 74,910 villages (Merdeka, 2017). The aim was to ensure effective, fair, and equal 
village-based programs (Law No. 6 of 2014, Article 72).  
However, empirical facts have proven the misuse of this fund leading to the unfulfillment of this objective. According to 
the deputy chairman of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), Laode, the irregularities observed in the 
management of village funds include fictitious procurement of goods and services, inflated budget, exclusion of the 
community in village deliberations, the use of village funds for personal gain, as well as weak supervision and 
embezzlement of village officials' salaries (Viva, 2017). Another method used is through the collaboration between the 
officials and law enforcement officers, especially the police. The data provided by ICW showed there has been a 
significant increase in the cases of village funds misuse since it was provided. 
 
Figure 1: Village Fund Corruption Case 
Source: (Indonesia Corruption Watch, 2018) 
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Some studies have reported the high rate of fund misuse is due to the low competence and quality of human resources 
and lack of supervision from the community (Mondale, Fahlevi, & Aliaman, 2017; Wibisono & Purnomo, 2017). 
Effective understanding and supervision have a positive impact on improving village financial accountability (Mondale 
et al., 2017; Wibisono & Purnomo, 2017). Moreover, based on the fraud theory, one of the causes of corruption in public 
organizations is the pressure while it is mostly due to bad corporate governance in the private sector (Kadir, Kiswanto, 
Widarini, Gunawan, & Puspitasari, 2017). 
Several works of research have also established a strong relationship between corporate governance and the occurrence 
of fraud (Kadir et al., 2017; Chen, Firth, Gao, & Rui, 2006; Mangala & Kumari, 2017; Eferakeya, Enaibre, & Offor, 
2016). Activities of fraud were found to be dominant in companies with poor management systems (Dunn, 2004; Farber, 
2005; Rezaee & Tuo, 2017). Therefore, there is a need for the establishment of an honesty culture in corporate 
organizations by the management to reduce fraud potential (Halbouni, Obeid, & Garbou, 2016). This, however, means 
companies with good management also known as Good Corporate Governance (GCG) tend to have good finance (Jan, 
2018). 
This led to the possibility of implementing GCG as one of the solutions to reduce fraud in village funds in line with the 
2015 Semarang State University Strategic Plan concerning the empowerment of the community's economy through the 
improvement of economic institutions to prosper and improve the welfare of the rural communities. Moreover, the 
village fund management involves social interaction between several stakeholders such as the central, regional and 
village governments, as well as the community.  
Therefore, GCG implementation is needed by the village government to protect the interests of stakeholders and, more 
specifically, to ensure the funds are managed following the objectives without any misuse. This research was used to 
empirically prove the influence of GCG implementation on fraud potential in village fund management (In’airat, 2015; 
Larelle Chapple, Ferguson, & Kang, 2005; Lutui & ’Ahokovi, 2017; Matoussi & Gharbi, 2011; Shi, Connelly, & 
Hoskisson, 2017; Wilhelm, Communications, & Bilbao, 2016). 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Fraud means cheating and according to the Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (2009), it is a dishonest 
fraudulent act conducted for personal gain thereby causing harm to others. Webster's New World Dictionary also 
explains it as a fraudulent or deception activity performed for personal gain while the International Standards of 
Auditing Section 240 defines it as "... intentional actions by deceiving members of company management playing a role 
in corporate governance, employees, or third parties to obtain unfair or illegal profits". 
Fraud is closely related to theft, corruption, conspiracy, embezzlement, money laundering, bribery, and extortion. This 
further led to the formulation of a map called fraud tree with three branches including corruption, asset misappropriation, 
and fraudulent statements by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) (Baader & Krcmar, 2018). In the 
government sector, fraud is mostly in the form of corruption and it is often observed in developing countries, including 
Indonesia (Prabowo, Cooper, Sriyana, & Syamsudin, 2017). To analyze the occurrence of corruption in public 
organizations, there are several perspectives developed three and they include schemata, corruption normalization, and 
moral development theories (Prabowo et al., 2017).  
Meanwhile, the development of a strong internal control system was recommended by COSO to guarantee a company's 
wealth, accuracy and correctness of accounting data, reliable financial statements, efficient and effective operation, and 
obedience to management policies, laws and regulations.  
This research was, however, based on the use of the governance system as an effort to reduce the occurrence of fraud. 
This is necessary considering the fact there is no management structure in place to avoid fraudulent acts since the 
issuance of the regulation in 2014 which has created several challenges in implementing Village Fund Allocation 
(Abidin, 2015). Moreover, the fraudulent activities have been reported to be due to the ineffectiveness of village 
facilitators, inadequate coaching and supervision from the subdistrict head, government, Development Supervisory Team 
(TP4), and the BPD or village council as well as the lack of community participation (Wibisono, 2017; Aziz, 2016). 
The Good Village Governance (GVG)  
This concept was developed from Good Corporate Governance (GCG) which is defined as a company's internal control 
system directed towards managing significant risks, securing company assets and increasing shareholder investment 
value in a long term to realize the business objectives. Moreover, it is the relationship between shareholders, creditors, 
financial markets, institutions, workers and companies. This, therefore, means GCG involves a set of rules and policies 
to guarantee the interests of stakeholders through appropriate supervision of company assets and efficient risk 
management process. Furthermore, this concept is needed to support the achievement of the goals set by the village 
government. 
It is needed due to the inefficiencies of the government in conducting its duties in the village as regards financial 
management (Aziz, 2016; Suparman, Kusnadi, & Harono, 2014). It was even reported, in some areas, that funds were 
embezzled by village officials and this was found to be due to weak accountability (Supriyadin, 2017; Sohuturon, 2017). 
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In several studies, the implementation of corporate governance has been able to improve company performance and 
avoid fraud (Chen et al., 2006; Mangala & Kumari, 2017; Eferakeya et al., 2016; Halbouni et al., 2016; Tan, Chapple, & 
Walsh, 2017). Other pieces of evidence found there was a difference in management between highly fraudulent 
companies and safe ones (Matoussi & Gharbi, 2011). 
There is a frequent occurrence of fraudulent activities in village funds and, according to President Joko Widodo, there 
were 900 village heads involved in the misuse of funds (Supriyadin, 2017) and fraud is mostly in the form of corruption 
in Village Fund Allocation (ADD), Village Funds, and Village Cash (Indonesia Corruption Watch, 2018).  
Indonesia Corruption Watch (2018), Mondale et al. (2017), and Wibisono & Purnomo (2017) found weak supervision 
from several stakeholders as well as the low community involvement in the management of village funds are the main 
causes of high fraud potential (Mondale et al., 2017). 
Therefore, Good Village Governance (GVG) was developed based on the concept of GCG in the private sector which 
has been proved by several empirical studies to have the ability to reduce fraud and achieve corporate performance 
(Chen et al., 2006; Mangala & Kumari, 2017; Eferakeya et al., 2016; Halbouni et al., 2016; Matoussi & Gharbi, 2011; 
Tan et al., 2017). Based on this, background, the following hypotheses were formulated: 
H1: GVG Implementation, Internal Control, and Citizen Participation have a significant effect on fraud potential. 
H2: GVG Implementation, Internal Control, Citizen Participation, and Potential Occurrence of Fraud have a significant 
effect on Village Government Performance. 
METHODOLOGY  
This research was conducted quantitatively with a causality design to examine the factors influencing the possibilities of 
fraud in village funds. The population was made of village officials in Demak Regency, Central Java directly responsible 
for the management of village funds and a total of 60 respondents were selected using an incidental sampling method. 
All respondents are village government officials who receive village funds. 
The research variables used include GVG implementation, External Supervision, Citizen Participation as the 
independent ones, Village Government Performance as the dependent variable while Fraud Potential was both an 
independent and dependent variable. The GVG implementation variable is measured by 11 question indicators, the 
external monitoring variable is measured by 7 indicators, citizen participation is measured by 4 indicators, the potential 
for fraud is measured by 5 indicators, and village government performance is measured by 7 indicators. All variables are 
measured on a Likert scale with 5 levels. 
Primary data was obtained from the use of questionnaires retrieved from previous researchers and provided to the 
respondents. Moreover, the data obtained were analyzed using descriptive analysis and a causality test was conducted on 
the variables. The causality test among variables using the Equation Model Structure (SEM) with the WarpPLS tool 
RESULTS/FINDINGS 
Table 1 presents the descriptive data of the respondents. The results showed most of the officials were male with only 8 
represented by 13% being women. The most predominant age range was 30-39 years old and the majority of the 
respondents have quite a long work experience as observed in the 57% that have worked for more than 5 years. 
Moreover, it is also important to note that only 4 of the village heads representing 7% were willing to be respondents in 
this research. 
Table 1: Research Respondents Description 
Respondents Description Total Percentage 
Gender  
Male  52 87 
Female 8 13 
Total  60 100% 
Age  
20 – 29 years old 8 13 
30 – 39 years old 20 34 
40 – 50 years old 18 30 
> 50 years old 14 23 
Total  60 100% 
Position 
Village head 4 7 
Village secretary 12 20 
Head of the development division 6 10 
Others 38 63 
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Total  60 100% 
Work Experience 
< 1 year 6 10 
2 – 3 years 12 20 
4 – 5 years 8 13 
> 5 years 34 57 
Total  60 100% 
Source: Research Analysis Data 
Descriptive statistics of the research variables are presented in Table 2. The results showed the mean value for the 
Village Government Performance was 28.03 which is in the high category. This means the respondents believe the 
performance of each village government has been good and following the expectations of the citizens. Moreover, Fraud 
Potential was found to be 8.61, which is a low category. This indicates the possibility of fraudulent activities in the 
management of the fund is very small. The GVG Implementation has a mean value of 47.15 which is in the high 
category while External Supervision and Citizen Participation were in the medium category and considered good 
enough. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Research Variables 
Research Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Village Government Performance 19 32 28.03 3.1387 
Fraud Potential 5 20 8.61 3.6881 
GVG Implementation 40 55 47.15 3.9164 
External Supervision 25 35 29.78 2.4849 
Citizen Participation 12 20 16.58  1.6526 
Source: Research Analysis Data 
The hypotheses formulated were tested for validity and reliability using SEM analysis and assisted by WarpPLS 
software. The results showed the composite reliability coefficients of GVG Implementation, External Supervision, 
Citizen Participation, Fraud Potential, and Village Government Performance were 0.858, 0.878, 0.849, 0.914, and 0.839 
respectively. Meanwhile, the values of Cronbach's alpha coefficients were 0.811, 0.835, 0.761, 0.873, and 0.786, 
respectively. This, therefore, means the research instruments fulfilled the requirements of validity and reliability. 
Several criteria in WarpPls also showed the research model fulfilled requirements and declared it to be fit. The Average 
path coefficient (APC) value was 0.235 with P = 0.013, Average Adjusted R-squared (AARS) value was 0.332 with P 
<0.001, Average R-squared (ARS) value was 0.371 with P <0.001, Average block VIF (AVIF) value was 2.170 while 
the Average full collinearity VIF (AFVIF) value was 2.397. A model is declared acceptable if all these values are less 
than or equal to 5 and, ideally, 3.3. 
The causality test results between variables using the Structural Equation Model method, we present in the figure and 
table below: 
 
Figure 2: Output of WarpPLS 
Source: Result of Analysis Data 
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Fraud Potential 0.419 0.010 0.013  
Village Government Performance 0.495 0.026 0.119 <0.001 
Path coefficients 
Fraud Potential -0.026 -0.282 -0.269  
Village Government Performance -0.002 -0.235 0.146 -0.687 
Source: Research Analysis Data 
DISCUSSION / ANALYSIS 
Table 3 shows the path analysis of the hypotheses test and the first was the relationship between Fraud Potential as a 
dependent variable and GVG, External Supervision and Citizen Participation as an independent variable. The second 
includes village government performance as the dependent variable with GVG, external supervision, citizen 
participation, and the fraud potential as the independent variables. 
The results showed different values for the influence of dependent variables on Fraud Potential. The P-value of GVG 
was 0.419 with a path coefficient of -0.026 and this indicates there was no significant relation. Moreover, External 
Supervision was 0.010 with a path coefficient of -0.282 which indicates a negative and significant effect while Citizen 
Participation was 0.013 with a path coefficient of -0.269 which means there was a negative and significant influence. 
Subsequently, varying results were also observed with the influence of the dependent variables in the second test on 
Village Government Performance. The P-value of GVG was 0.495 with a path coefficient of -0.002 to show the absence 
of any significant effect. External Supervision was 0.026 with a path coefficient of -0.235 indicating the existence of a 
negative and significant effect. Furthermore, Citizen Participation was 0.119 with a path coefficient of 0.146 which 
means there was no significant relationship while Fraud Potential was <0.001 with a path coefficient of -0.687 showing a 
significant and negative effect. The findings also showed Fraud Potential has the greatest path coefficient than other 
independent variables and this means it has a more dominant influence on Village Government Performance. 
The results showed there was no significant effect of GVG on fraud potential while external supervision and citizen 
participation have a negative and significant effect. This means the implementation of GVG is not a determinant to 
control the occurrence of fraud in village fund management but rather through the use of effective supervision from 
external parties as well as the active participation of citizens in the management process. 
The supervising role of different parties, as well as the involvement of citizens, can make village officials become more 
careful in managing funds and also in the prevention of fraud. This is because the active participation of more citizens 
can ensure transparency and accountability in the fund management activities of the officials. 
These findings are not in line with the report of previous studies that government can prevent fraud(Chen et al., 2006; 
Mangala & Kumari, 2017; Eferakeya et al., 2016; Halbouni et al., 2016; Matoussi & Gharbi, 2011; Tan et al., 2017). It 
is, however, believed the implementation of GCG is a solution to reduce fraud in village funds since the management 
process involves social interaction between several stakeholders such as central, regional and village governments as 
well as the community. 
Several studies have associated the high misappropriation of village funds to the lack of supervision from the community 
(Mangala & Kumari, 2017; Wibisono, 2017). As earlier stated, effective understanding and supervision have a positive 
impact on the improvement of financial accountability (Widarnawati et al., 2018). These previous findings confirmed the 
importance of external supervision as well as the active participation of citizens in preventing fraud.  
The results showed only external supervision and fraud potential had a significant effect on village government 
performance while no influence was found with GVG and citizen participation. This finding showed the implementation 
of GVG is not effective in ensuring good performance of the village government and the same was observed with citizen 
participation. Furthermore, external control was found to have a negative instead of positive influence because good 
supervision is expected to provide a better performance; therefore, it is recommended this variable is re-investigated. 
Fraud Potential was also found to have a negative and significant effect on Village Government Performance. This 
means a smaller potential of fraudulent activities is good for the performance of the government and vice versa. It also 
showed cheating and misappropriates of funds make it impossible for village officials to conduct the required programs 
for development. 
Summarily, these findings are contrary to the results of previous studies that the implementation of corporate governance 
has been able to improve company performance (Tan et al., 2017; Dalwai, Basiruddin, & Rasid, 2015; Aggarwal, 2013; 
Cheema & Din, 2013; Kamardin & Haron, 2011; Pathan & Faff, 2013; Rahman & Bremer, 2016). This shows good 
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village governance has not been an important instrument in some districts of Central Java while government 
performance was more influenced by other factors like the Javanese culture. 
CONCLUSION 
The implementation of GVG was found not to have a significant effect on the potentials of experiencing fraudulent 
activities in village fund management while external supervision and citizen participation have a negative and significant 
effect. Furthermore, it also indicated the implementation of GVG and citizen participation were not proven to have a 
significant effect on village government performance while external supervision showed negative influences. 
Meanwhile, the potential for fraudulent activities was found to have the most significant effect on the performance of the 
government. Therefore, there is a need to put appropriate attention to the possibilities of fraud to ensure the efficient 
conduct of governmental activities. 
It is suggested all related parties focus on preventing fraud in the village fund management and this is expected to be 
most effective with the strengthening of supervisory activities as well as the level of citizen participation. This should be 
conducted to reduce the possibilities of fraud to improve village government performance. 
LIMITATION AND STUDY FORWARD 
This study uses a few respondents. The theme of research on fraud is the cause of the low participation of village 
officials to become research respondents. We suggest different data search methods, cooperating with local governments 
in finding data so that respondents have an increased response rate. 
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